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Volume XXXI November, 1942 Number 1
WHAT CONSTITUTES "DOING BUSINESS" BY A
FOREIGN CORPORATION IN KENTUCKY
By W LEwis ROBERTS*
A corporation of one state cannot transact or do business
in another state without complying with the conditions laid
down by the latter.' In fact, all the states of the Umon have
statutes imposing restrictions upon foreign corporations not en-
gaged in interstate commerce, as to the terms under which these
foreign corporations may do business within their borders.2 It
has always been a problem to determine just what constitutes
"doing business" by a foreign corporation. Tns problem may
come up in any one of three ways. (1) A court may be called
upon to determine whether it has jurisdiction for the purpose
of service of process over a corporation orgamzed in a sister
state, (2) It may have to decide upon the validity of a tax
assessed upon such a corporation for the privilege of "doing
business" within the state; and (3) It may have to settle the
question of whether the foreign corporation has done business
so that it comes within the penalties prescribed for not having
followed the provisions for filing with the secretary of state and
appointing an agent on whom service of process may be had,
that is, whether it qualifies to do business under the statutory
provisions. As Professor Ballantine has pointed out, "the
nature and extent of business requisite to make a corporation
liable to" the power a state may assert over a foreign corpora-
tion, "may vary somewhat with the purpose for wnch it is
asserted.' ' As another writer has stated the courts are in hope-
* Professor of Law, Umversity of Kentucky College of Law.
A.B., 1903, Brown; A.M., 1915, Pennsylvama State College; J.D., 1920,
Umversity of Chicago; S.J.D., 1930, Harvard. Author of various
articles in legal periodicals, and of Roberts' Cases on Personal
Property (1938).
'Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 10 L. Ed. 274 (1839);
Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 19 L. Ed. 357 (1869).
-36 Harv. L. Rev. 327.3 Corporations (1927), Sec. 288.
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less confusion and conflict as to what constitutes "doing busi-
ness. " 4
We not only have to distinguish between these three legal
purposes, service of process, taxation and qualification, we also
have to bear m mind that the phrase, "doing business," is given
a broader meaning when used in a tax statute than is given to
it in a statute prohibiting a foreign corporation from doing or
transacting business in a state before it has complied with the
conditions which the statute imposes on foreign corporations.5
It may be worthwhile to look at some of the definitions that
have been given of "doing business" before going into the
decisions to see what the courts have decided when the problem
has been presented to them in some one of its several forms.
DEFNTI0
In Larkin Co. v Commonwealt, 6 the Kentucky Court of
Appeals was confronted with a situation where the agent of the
defendant company had been in the state thirty days or more
advertising and displaying soap products which the defendant
sold on orders sent direct to its factory in Buffalo, New York
Judge Thomas, speaking for the court, said.
"Business does not mean stock or machinery, or capital and the
like. While business cannot be done without these, in commercial
language it is as distinct from them as labor is from capital. In
speaking of the business that may be done by a merchant, banker, or
railroad company, the mind does not contemplate or dwell upon the
character or quality of the means used, but of the operations, whether
great or small, complex or simple, numerous or few for one or the
other of these conditions may arise from much or little stock or
capital. In other words, business does not mean dry goods, nor cash,
nor iron rails and coaches. Business is not these lifeless and dead
things, but the activities in which they are employed, when in motion,
then the owners are said to be sn business; and then it is that
merchants and others speak of the profits of the business."
The same court some three years later points out in Hauger
v InternationaZ Trading Co.,7 another element in "doing busi-
ness" in a state. It is said there that the word "business" in
almost all jurisdictions means the business for which the cor-
poration is organized, and not-as was the case before the court
-the taking of stock subscriptions to procure the capital nec-
essary to carry on the business."
10 So. Cal. L. Rev. 85, at 86.
'Anderson v. Morris & E. R. Co., 216 Fed. 83, at 88 (1914).6172 Ky 106, 189 S. W 3 (1916).
" 184 Ky. 794, 214 S. W 438 (1919).
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-- - ' 'DOING BusINEss"
A -writer in the Virginia Law Reviews states that "doing
business" in the state of Virginia, as used in a franchise statute,
has the same meaning regardless of whether applied to a for-
eign or a domestic corporation. He then quotes from a United
States Supreme Court decision9 to the effect that business in
this relation means some profitable activity carried on by a
corporation on its own account and not the mere collection and
distribution of the avails of its property Further, a note writer
in the North Carolina Law Review'0 adds that the test of "doing
business" seems to be whether the corporation by its acts in the
state shows an intent to carry on an effective, material part of
its business in the state. We are also reminded of the fact that
"doing business" is not absolute but a relative term."
The most concise statement as to what constitutes "doing
business" is to be found in the Restatement of Conflict of
Laws. 12 It is as follows. "Doing business is doing a series of
similar acts for the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary ben-
efit, or otherwise accomplishing an object, or doing a single act
for such purpose with the intention of thereby initiating a
series of such acts." This statement seems to summarize well
the other definitions we have considered. The application of
any of these definitions to a particular set of facts, however,
is not so easy
The United States Supreme Court has given a brief defini-
tion in Von Baumbach v. Sargent Land Co.13 in these words
"The term 'business' has been defined as that which occupies
the time, attention, and labor of men for the purpose of a liveli-
hood or profit." The same court has also said that each case
must be decided -upon the facts presented and that no all-
embracing rule can be laid down for determining what consti-
tutes doing business by a foreign corporation. The business, in
a general way, it may be said, "must be of such a character and
extent as to warrant the inference that the corporation has
subjected itself to the jurisdiction and laws of the district in
8Vol. 26, p. 373 (1940).
"U. S. v. Emert, Bird, Thayer Realty Co., 237 U. S. 29 (1915).
"0Vol. 5, p. 361 (1927).
nRothschold, Jurisdiction of Foreign Corporations zn Personam
(1930) 17 Va. L. Rev. 129, at 132.
Sec. 167a.
242 U. S. 503, 37 S. Ct. 201, 61 L. Ed. 460 (1916).
KENTUOKY LAW JOURNAL
wich it is served and in winch it is bound to appear when a
proper agent has been served with process.'14
It has also been recognized that in determining whether a
foreign corporation is doing business within a state, each state
settles the question under its own laws.15 The Supreme Court
has recognized this fact as in Kansas City Structural Steel Com-
pany v Arkansas,'0 it said. "We accept the decision of the
Supreme Court of Arkansas as to what constitutes the doing of
business within the meaning of its own laws."
INTERSTATE COM CIIcE
As one authority has pointed out, after the court has de-
termined whether the activities carried on by the foreign cor-
poration amount to doing business within the state, it must
determine whether such activities constitute commerce. If it is
commerce, is it interstate commerce ' If it is interstate com-
merce, of course, the state cannot impose a burden on it by tax-
ation or any other method. If the state statute amounts to a
burden on such commerce, it is clearly bad. He further points
out that some courts have overlooked the fact that you cannot
have interstate commerce unless some business has been done
and treat the two, doing business and interstate commerce, as
mutually exclusive.' 7 We shall have occasion in looking through
the cases to note that if the court once finds that it is dealing
with a case of interstate commerce, it may say that it is not a
case of doing business within the state.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has denied the application
of the provisions of Section 571 of the Kentucky Statutes and
also the right of the legislature to tax where the business being
done came within the purview of the commerce clause of the
federal constitution. Where a traveling salesman solicited
orders for shoes manufactured in another state, the manufac-
turer was not subject to a penalty for doing business in the state
without first having filed with the secretary of state as foreign
"St. Louis, S. W Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U. S. 218, 33 S. Ct.
245, 57 L. Ed. 486 (1913).
"Halpen v North American Refractories Co., 151 Misc. 764, 272
N. Y. S. 393 (1934).
269 U. S. 148, 70 L. Ed. 204 (1925)
17Isaacs, Analysts of Dozng Buszness (1927) 100 Cent. L. Jr. 177,
at 188.
FOREIGN CORPORATIOS---"'DOING BUSINESS"
corporations are required to do under Section 571.18 A foreign
corporation operating boats on the Cumberland river between
Nashville, Tennessee, and Evansville, Indiana, was held not
amenable to this section,1 9 nor was a company which sold blowers
through an agent m Kentucky, subject to punishment for not
having first qualified under the statute.20 'Where an Iowa man-
ufacturer shipped materials for siloes into the state, he was
given the protection of the commerce clause.21 Also where a
foreign corporation took a mortagage on Kentucky realty to
secure the payment of notes payable in the state of Kentucky,
it was held not to be a "doing of business" subject to the statu-
tory requirements. 22 As a final instance coming under the com-
merce clause, consider the case of Logan-Pocahontas Fuei Co.
v. Commonwealth,23 where a foreign company had bought the
entire output of a Kentucky coal mine for sale in other states.
It was there held that the company did not have to comply with
Section 571 of the Statutes.
AcTs Tr-T Aim NOT "DoING BusNEss"
In our effort to determine what constitutes "doing busi-
ness" in a state, it may be well to apply the process of elimnna-
tion and see some of the things that do not make up a "doing
or transacting business." In the first place, it seems clear that
single or isolated transactions are not "doing business."24 One
authority states tins proposition as follows.
"In construing the effect of statutes prohibiting a foreign corpo-
ration from 'doing business' or 'doing any business' in the state until
it has complied with specified requirements, there is some conflict,
but the great weight of authority is to the effect that isolated trans-
actions, especially commercial, do not constitute a 'doing, transact-
ing, or carrying on a business' within the meaning of such statutes,
but that such statutes contemplate some continuance in business."
' Commonwealth v. Hogan, McMorrow & Ticke, 25 Ky L. Rep.
41, 74 S. W 737 (1903).
" Ryman Steamboat Line Co. v. Commonwealth, 125 Ky. 253, 101
S. W 403 (1907).
'Louisville Trust Co. v. Bayer Steam Blower Co., 166 Ky. 744,
179 S. W 737 (1915)
'Western Silo Co. v. Johnson, 203 Ky. 704, 262 S. W 1093
(1924).
Hughes v. R. 0. Campbell Coal Co., 201 Ky. 839, 258 S. W 671
(1924).
197 Ky. 174, 246 S. W 433 (1923)
"Anderson v. Morris & E. R. Co., supra n. 5; Heman v Northern
Region Supply Corp., 262 Fed. 181 (1920), Chattanooga Nat. Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n. v. Denson, 189 U. S. 408, 23 S. Ct. 630 (1903).
'Fletcher's Cyclopedia of Corporations, Vol. 9, p. 9959, Sec. 5919.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
The same authority qualifies tins statement, however, by saying
that "on the other hand, the test has been said to be 'not that
it is a single transaction, but that it is done with the intent to
engage in business' "26
Soliciting business for a foreign corporation does not amount
to a "doing of business" by the foreign corporation. The United
States Supreme Court has passed upon this question many
times and set forth its position in regard to the problem in Green
v Chicago, Burington & Quincy By. C0.27 in these words
"The business shown in this case was, in substance, nothing
more than that of solicitation. Without undertaking to formulate
any general rule defining what transactions will constitute 'doing
business' in the sense that liability to service is incurred, we think
that this is not enough to bring the defendant within the district so
that process can be served upon it."
The railroad company maintained an office for securing business
in Pennsylvaia, a state in which it had no tracks and ran no
trams.
One of the outstanding Kentucky cases on the point is
Larksn v Commonwealth.2 s There a foreign corporation sold
goods in Kentucky by mail and sent around traveling showrooms
for advertising purposes. The court said the testimony showed
only interstate commerce transactions and the defendant was
not amenable under the statute. The court also held in Geo.
Cox Co. v rhonograph C0.29 that mere putting on an adver-
tising campaign during wnch the representatives of the com-
pany took no orders for goods was not a doing business that
would require a filing of a statement with the secretary of state;
and in Tennessee Publishmng Co. v. C. L. Walker & 0o.30 the
court reached the same conclusion where the Tennessee company
sent a solicitor into Kentucky to call upon parties who handled
and sold its publication, The "Tennesseean." There the solic-
itor had no power to bind his company
Collecting a debt by a foreign corporation is not a "doing
of business" within the state nor taking of a mortgage to secure
a debt;31 and that is true even though the note sued on was
Ibid., p. 9964.
205 U. S. 530,51 L. Ed. 916 (1907).
Supra n. 6.
208 Ky. 398, 270 S. W 811, 14 Ky L. J. 166 (1926).
20 205 Ky. 420, 265 S. W 941 (1924).
a Ichenhauser v. Landrum's Assignee, 153 Ky 316, 155 S. W
738 (1913)
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given by a local agent for expenses incurred in putting on an
advertising campaign.3 2 Tis is also true where a bank or
finance company in another state makes loans to parties living in
the state, the transactions being completed in the state in winch
the lender is located.
33
Then come the cases on the border line, the cases involving
a series of sales in neighboring states. Take Three States Buggy
& Implement Co. v Commonwealth3 4 where an Illinois corpora-
tion furnished goods to a firm in Kentucky as the latter sold
them on specific terms. The Illinois corporation agreed to take
back goods on hand at the termination of the contract. The
Kentucky firm agreed to keep the goods insured for the benefit
of the seller. The court held that there was not an agency, but
a series of sales and that the Illinois corporation was not doing
business in the state in violation of the statute. In Good Roads
Machinery Company v Commonwealth, 35 the Bohon Company
of Iarrodsburg wrote to an Indiana firm that the county
wanted to buy good roads machinery and for it to send a man
to interview the county agents. It did so and later paid the
Bohon Company a commission for its part in the transaction.
It was held that this fact did not make the Bohon Company an
agent of the Indiana firm within the meaning of the crminnal
statute under winch the prosecution was begun. Bringing the
parties to a transaction together does not, therefore, constitute
an agency where there is no claim of a continuous or even spo-
radic course of action or transaction. Then there is the case of
B. C. Artman Lumber Company v. Bogard.36 In this case a
Mchigan corporation, operating a sawmill in 1916 in Illinois,
contracted for ten trees growing on land in Kentucky The
plaintiff, the buyer, was to have as much time as it required to
remove the trees. They had not been removed by the time this
country entered the first World War. Without repaying the
consideration paid by the plaintiff, the original seller sold the
same trees to the defendant, who cut them and shipped them
to market where he received a substantial increase over the
George H. Cox Company v. Phonograph Company, supra n. 29.
'Citizens Trust & Guaranty Company v Hays, 167 Ky 560, 180
S. W 811 (1915), Jones v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation,
205 Ky. 227, 265 S. W 620 (1924).
32 Ky. L. Rep. 385, 105 S. W 971 (1907).
146 Ky. 690, 143 S. W 18 (1912).
191 Ky 392, 230 S. W 953 (1921).
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amount originally paid by the plaintiff. The defendant knew
at the time that the plaintiff had paid for the trees. Suit was
for the sale price on an implied contract, the tort being waived
by the plaintiff. The defense offered was that the plaintiff had
not complied with the provisions of section 571 of the Statutes
and therefore was not entitled to sue in the state courts. The
court said that while a single transaction nght constitute a
doing of business in the state, in this case there was an executed
contract passing title to the trees to the plaintiff and that it
could maintain its action to recover for the taking of its prop-
erty
At the time this case was decided the law in Kentucky was
that if a foreign corporation did not comply with the statutory
requirements by filing a statement with the secretary of state, it
could not sue in the state courts. It was an outlaw and not pro-
tected by the laws of the state. This rule was changed in the
decision of Witiams v. Dearborn Truck Company37 in 1927.
Since that time a foreign corporation is no longer treated as an
outlaw for failure to qualify, but does become subject to the
penalties imposed by the statute.
The mere appointment of an agent in this state by a foreign
corporation is not a doing of business. In Commonwealth v
Chattanooga Im'p. & Mfg. Co.,38 a Tennessee corporation had
appointed an agent in the state of Kentucky after it had sold
a printing press in the state, but the agent handled no machinery
for the defendant and had solicited no business at the time the
question arose. Several years before, the defendant had sold a
press and later had put its claim against the buyer into the
hands of an attorney to collect. The attorney secured judgment
against the buyer, levied on the press and bought it in for the
defendant. The defendant later sold it in the state. This trans-
action was held not to constitute doing business in the state
as the defendant had a right to collect its claim. In another
case, bonds owned by a West Virginia corporation were secured
on land situated in Kentucky The court held that they were
not subject to a tax in Kentucky as they had gained no business
" 218 Ky. 271, 291 S. W 388 (1927), See also Falls City Machinery
& Wrecking Company v Sobel-Mart Furniture Company, 219 Ky.
195, 292 S. W 814 (1927).
8 126 Ky 636, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1019, 104 S. W 389 (1907).
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situs in this state.3 9 A pther case involving the right to tax is
Board of Council of City of Frankfort v Illinois Life Insurance
Co.40 A foreign insurance company bought out a domestic in-
surance company and the state treasurer wrongfully withheld
from the foreign corporation, the securities of the domestic com-
pany on deposit with the treasurer. The foreign insurance com-
pany was not required to make a deposit of securities and the
detention was unwarranted. This wrongful detention by the
state was held not to give the securities a situs for tax purposes
in this state.
There are several interesting decisions by the Court of
Appeals involving the right of the state to impose a franchise
tax on foreign corporations on the ground that they were doing
business within the state. Commonwealth v Union Pacsfic R.
Co.41 is probably the most outstanding of these. Suit was
brought by the Commonwealth to secure back taxes on freight
cars of foreign railroads, which were brought into the state on
a "per diem freight car arrangement" by railroads owning and
operating lines within the state. The court held them not tax-
able. It was also sought to assess a franchise tax against the
defendant company on the ground that it had been letting and
hiring freight cars during the same time for a profit to domestic
corporations and that this subjected the defendant to a fran-
chise tax. While the court approved the taxing of tank, refrig-
erator and Pullman cars in the state where the average number
was ascertained under the "unit rule," it pointed out that for-
eign roads do not send their freight cars into the state for a
profit, as the rental paid gave little or no profit in fact, and they
were not doing business in the state as were the tank lines and
similar companies. The court quoted from Mr. Justice Holmes'
opinon in New York Central Railroad v Miller42 to the effect
that foreign freight cars come into the state on "random ex-
cursions of casually chosen cars, determined by the various
orders of particular shippers and the arbitrary convenience of
other roads." Mr. Justice Dietzman further pointed out that
no purpose of the owning road was served by the presence of
the cars within the state.
I Commonwealth v. Consolidated Casualty Co., 170 Ky. 103, 185
S.W 508 (1916).129 Ky. 823, 112 S. W 924 (1908).
214 Ky. 339, 283 S. W 119 (1926).
S202 U. S. 584, at 597, 50 L. Ed. 1155 (1905).
K. L. J.--2
KENTUCKY LAw JouRNAL
Two of these cases involving franchise taxes concern for-
eign companies owning and operating barges and boats on the
rivers in or bordering on the state. In one case a barge com-
pany carried on a transportation business on the Mississippi
and Ohio rivers between Memphis, Tennessee, and Cincinnati,
Ohio. On its trips it touched at points in Kentucky The court
based its decision denying the right to impose a franchise tax,
on the ground that the defendant was carrying on an interstate
business. It said.
'Where, as in this instance, a foreign corporation engaged in
interstate commerce along navigable waters has no tangible property
taxable in this state, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the
imposition of a franchise tax is, in effect, a tax both on the right to
navigate navigable waters lying between this and other states, and,
therefore, a burden which the state has no right to nnpose.' ' '
In another barge company case, American Barge inne Co.
v Board of Supervsors of Tax of Jefferson County,4 the de-
fendant's business of transportation extended from Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, to New Orleans, Louisiana, the defendant had an
office in Louisville, as well as offices in Pittsburgh, Cincinnati,
Memphis, New Orleans and Chicago. The business was primarily
managed from the Louisville office and taxing authorities of
Jefferson county sought to assess all the property of the defend-
ant, including barges and open accounts. It was not shown
that any of the barges were in Kentucky or that they did more
than pick up freight as they passed up and down the rivers.
The court said the idea of location of the barges in Kentucky
was rebutted by the nature of the business and the domain of
its operations.
Turning now to the cases where the Court of Appeals has
held certain actions to be doing business within the state, let
us take them up under three headings (a) Doing business for
the purpose of qualifying under the statute, (b) for the pur-
pose of serving process, and (c) for the purpose of taxation.
ACTs THAT CONSTITUTE "DOING BusINEss" WITIN THE STATE.
(a) For Qualifying Under the Statute.
In Moore, Jr et al. v Racmne Rubber Company45 the sales
manager of the foreign corporation visited the plaintiff in
' Commonwealth v Lee Line Company, 159 Ky 476, 167 S. W
409 (1914)
"246 Ky 573, 55 S. W (2d) 416 (1932).
194 Ky 106, 238 S. W 381 (1920).
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Louisville three times during the year. The defendant had no
other customer m the state. The question arose whether the
defendant was doing business within the meaning of the statute
and the court held that it was. It said that it was the course
of business established in the state and it was immaterial that
the defendant had only one customer. In relying on Interna-
tionaZ Harvester Co. v Commonweath,"4 the court observed.
"It may be readily understood why a single transaction between
a non-resident defendant and a resident of this state would not
constitute the doing of business m tins state; but when a non-resi-
dent corporation in a comparatively short period of time has a
number of transactions with a resident of this state, although its
transactions be confined to one person or firm or corporation, still it
is a course of business established in this state and it matters not
that it has only one customer therein."
The decision m Miburn Wagon Co. v. Commonwealth47
was that a foreign corporation furnislhng wagons to an agent
in Kentucky, shipping them from a point in Ohio, and operating
under an "agent's commission contract," was doing business in
Kentucky Title to the wagons was retained by the Ohio cor-
poration and the agent was required to keep the proceeds from
the sales as a separate fund belonging to the shipper. A Ten-
nessee firm taking orders for fruit trees and then later deliver-
ing the trees, was found to be doing business within the state
without first qualifying under the statute. The court observed
that the execution of a contract of sale was as much carrying
on business as the delivery of the goods. The court was moved
to make this observation because the defendant had pleaded
that it had filed before the delivery of the trees.4 8 Another
case based upon circumstances arising in the state of Tennessee
is Orr's Admr v Orr 4 9 Here the maker of a note contracted
to sell drugs in Tennessee for a Minnesota firm. The latter had
not qualified to do business in Tennessee. The goods were to
be purchased by the salesman f. o. b. Winona, Minnesota. The
correspondence and contract referred to the Tennessee party
as "agent" and the seller agreed to take back any goods left on
his hands. The corporation undertook to recover from the
"agent's" estate on a note given by him and secured by a mort-
gage on land situated in Kentucky The Kentucky court, under
147 Ky. 655, 145 S. W 393 (1912), affirmed in 234 U. S. 579.
- 139 Ky. 330, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 937, 104 S. W 323 (1907)
Knoxville Nursery Co. v Commonwealth,108 Ky 6, 21 Ky L.
Rep. 1483, 55 S. W 691 (1900)
- 157 Ky. 570, 163 S. W 757 (1914).
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the rule then prevailing in this state that a foreign corporation
that did not first qualify under the statute was practically an
outlaw, held the note void and non enforceable in this state.
(b) For Service of Process.
What constitutes a valid service of process comes up under
the federal constitution and has been passed upon time and
time again by the United States Supreme Court. As already
pointed out, that court has said that to make a foreign cor-
poration subject to the process of a state court, the corporation
must be engaged in a business of such a character and to such
extent as to warrant the inference that the corporation has
subjected itself to the jurisdiction and the laws of the state in
which it is served.50 It has said that the residence of an officer
of the foreign corporation in the state does not necessarily give
the corporation a domicile in the state. It has said that he
must be there officially, representing the corporation in its busi-
ness. Service upon a director who resided in the state did
not bring the corporation within the jurisdiction of the state
court where the corporation was doing no business in the state at
the time.51 A summons served on the president of a foreign,
corporation when he was passing through the state, engaged
exclusively on personal matters unconnected with the company's
affairs was not effective.
52
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in considering this ques-
tion in INternatsonal Harvester Co. v Kentucky,53 said that a
trading corporation is personally present for the purposes of
service of summons when it has established a place of business
or trade. To use the words of the court "The question is not to
be controlled by the extent of the agent's authority, but by the
extent and scope of the business done and the agent's connec-
tion therewith."5 At the time the summons was served on the
alleged agent, he was soliciting orders for the appellant's goods
in substantially the same way as when the appellant was ad-
mittedly doing business in the state before it moved its location
to New Albany on the Indiana side of the Ohio river, with the
See supra n. 14.
Couley v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U. S. 406, 23 S. Ct. 728
(1903).
'Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Co. v. McKibbm, 243 U. S.
264, 37 S. Ct. 280 (1916).
Supra n. 46.
At page 664.
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one exception that the proposals had to be accepted by the gen-
eral manager at New Albany The court held the summons
good.
In Makeever v. Georgia Southern & F Ry. Co.5 5 a foreign
railroad corporation maintained an agent and office in this state
for soliciting business and for rate adjustment thereon. The court
held that although the solicitation of business by the agent did
not constitute doing business witlnn the state, yet maintaining
the office for solicitation and rate adjustment on domestic busi-
ness did amount to doing business in such a way as to manifest
its presence in the state and to render it subject to service of
process. The fact that the agent of a foreign corporation comes
into the state, does not necessarily bring the corporation along
too. The Kentucky court has expressed this proposition in the
following language in Mergenthater Lnotype Company v.
Griffin:
56
"The agent, however, is not the corporation, and may come with-
in the state without bringing the corporation with him; but when an
agent of a corporation comes within the state and there begins to
transact business for the corporation, then he has brought the corpo-
ration with him, and by his activities he has manifested the presence
of the corporation within the state. The determination of the
question whether a foreign corporation is doing business within a
state or not is often a matter of great difficulty and extreme nicety
No all embracing rule as to what is doing business has been laid
down."
The court further said that having a man in the state author-
ized to do and doing business for the corporation, is doing busi-
ness in the state and the corporation may be sued therein, no
matter what its own conception of his relation to it may be.
A note writer in a leading law review has summarized the
elements that seem to be required for service of process. In
the first place he states there must be some relatively continuous
commercial transactions within the state, second, the physical
presence of the corporation, third, an agent who is acting for
the corporation on whom service may be had which service will
reasonably give notice to the corporation, and fourth, local as
contrasted with interstate transactions. 57
(c) For Taxation.
The test for purposes of taxation is not necessarily the same
as for service of process. Professor Isaacs has said that while
219 Ky. 699, 294 S. W 144 (1927).8226 Ky. 159, 10 S. W (2d) 633 (1928)
6 N. C. L.R ev 93, at 94.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
presence may be the test for service of process, activity is the
test for taxation. To use his own words
"In summary we may say- The business which must be trans-
acted by a foreign corporation to permit service of process must be
such as to warrant the inference that the corporation is present. To
subject such a corporation to taxation for doing business, the trans-
action must not only show that the corporation is present but also
that it is active. In order that qualification be rendered necessary,
the corporation must not only be present and active, but its activity
must be continuous."'
Of course, if a foreign corporation has property located in
the state, it is subject to taxation as well as property of resi-
dents. Railroad cross ties piled on a river bank awaiting ship-
ment by boat, were held subject to taxation, although they be-
longed to a foreign corporation.59  If, however, they were in
interstate commerce and had not come to a bona fide stop, this
would not be so. 60
While the delivering of goods sold on orders sent to an
adjoining state would not be such a doing of business as to sub-
ject the seller to taxation in the state, nevertheless, if the for-
eign corporation allows its deliverymen to carry extra goods
on its trucks and supply the extra demands of its customers, it
will render itself liable to a license tax. This was the case of
City of Newport v Wagner 61 A manufacturer of soft drinks
in Cincinnati, Ohio, sold its goods in Newport on orders tele-
phoned in from Newport or sent by letter through the mails.
It was the practice for the deliverymen to carry extra goods
on their trucks and to supply the needs of customers beyond
the orders sent in to the corporation headquarters. The cor-
poration was held liable for the license fee required under a city
ordinance of Newport.
Sometimes the shoe seems to be on the other foot and we
find the taxpayer trying to show that the corporation in which
he holds stock is doing business within the state and that he is
entitled to the exemption provided for in the Kentucky Stat-
utes, Section 4085. That was the case in Commonwealtib v.
Muir 62 The taxpayer owned stock in the United States Steel
rs 25 Col. L. Rev. 1018, at 1040.
5' Johnson v. Bradley-Watkins Tie Co., 120 Ky. 136, 27 Ky. L.
Rep. 540, 85 S. W 726 (1905).
1 Champlain Realty Co. v Town of Brattleboro, 260 U. S. 366, 43
S. Ct. 146, 67 L. Ed. 309 (1922)
168 Ky. 641, 182 S. W 834 (1916), Aff'd 251 U. S. 95.
170 Ky. 435, 186 S. W 194 (1916).
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Company, a holding company, winch owned practically all the
stock of the American Steel and Wire Company, winch in turn
had its place of business in Louisville and owned warehouses
located there and paid taxes thereon. The court held that since
the owner of the stock of a corporation does not own the property
of the corporation, the defendant corporation could not be said
to have paid taxes on its property in the state and did not come
within the exemption provided for in the statute.
In another case, a Virginia corporation invested its capital
in a large tract of coal and timber land situated in Kentucky
It neither mined, lumbered nor farmed the land, but held it for
appreciation in value. This was held to be doing business within
the state; 63 and in still another case, a Missouri corporation had
its entire capital invested in Kentucky farm and timber land
and live stock. It engaged in no business outside the state of
Kentucky Its Kentucky land was used for stock raising pur-
poses. A license tax nposed on its authorized capital stock
was sustained. The court said the state had a right to impose a
reasonable license tax upon the authorized capital stock for the
privilege of owning property in or doing business in the state.64
Consider one more decision of the Court of Appeals, Com-
monwealth v. Southern Rai7way (ompany, 65 where a Virginia
corporation bought at decretal sale one hundred and twenty-
seven miles of railroad trackage in Kentucky It organized the
Southern Railway Company under the Kentucky laws and trans-
ferred its purchase to the new company Both companies had
the same officers and directors. The Virginia corporation bought
and paid for all the rolling stock of the Kentucky company It
advertised as the Southern System and the receipts were sent
to a common treasurer. The court held that the Virginia com-
pany was exercising rights and privileges under Section 4077
of the Kentucky Statutes, and consequently it was liable for a
franchise tax. The court said that the mere ownerslnp of the
stock of the Kentucky company did not constitute doing busi-
ness within the state but the control and management exercised
over the subsidiary corporation, the sending of the income from
the Kentucky road to the office of the parent company and the
Greene, Auditor v. Kentemc Corp., 175 Ky. 661, 194 S. W 820
(1917).
"Hillman Land & Iron Company v. Com., 174 Ky 755, 192 S. W
880 (1917).
193 Ky. 474, 237 S. W 11 (1921).
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disbursement of the same by that company and the fact that
the officers of the two roads were identical, all pointed to such
a doing of business as to render the parent corporation liable
for the tax.
In summarizing the holding in the Wheeling Steel Company
case, a note writer says "It seems, therefore, that the Supreme
Court has reduced the doctrine of business situs to its lowest
common denominator, i. e., there must be a business carried on
in the state, and it must be fair for the state to tax that busi-
ness." 66 That is almost as specific as one can be in determining
when the state can tax a foreign corporation which it claims is
doing business within its borders.
CONCLUSION.
A review of the decisions of the Court of Appeals shows
that no specific rule as to what constitutes doing business in this
state by a foreign corporation has been worked out. Each case
depends upon its own facts. This is due in part, at least, to the
fact that the activities carried on by corporations are diverse.
To use the words of a note writer "Clearly, the multifarious
modes of corporate activity make it impossible to establish any
single rule as to what constitutes 'doing business' for tins
purpose, the courts have recogmzed that to a great extent, each
case must be decided upon its own facts.
67
Probably no clearer statement of tins fact has been formu-
lated than that of Professor Beale. He says
"It is not always easy to determine exactly what constitutes the
doing of business within a state. Each case has to be determined
upon its own facts and the court will look at all the evidence and
decide the question on a practical basis. The decision of any case is
therefore authority for another only in a very limited sense, and one
will not be surprised to find that very slight distinctions lead to dif-
ferent results, or even that cases apparently indistinguishable on the
facts are differently decided."'
As accurate as this general statement is, it cannot be of
very great aid to a court when it is confronted with this prob-
lem. We have seen that there are some sets of facts where we
can foretell what a court will do when they are presented. We
have seen that initial transactions do not constitute "doing busi-
ness", that single or isolated transactions are not "doing busi-
43 W Va. L. Qr. 221-4 (1937)
19 Minn. L. Rev 556, at 557.
'Conflict of Laws (1935), p. 828.
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ness", that neither does soliciting business, nor selling goods
by mail, nor putting on an advertising campaign in the state.
We have seen also that a foreign corporation may collect a debt
without having to qualify to do business within the state. Bring-
ing parties to a transaction together is not "doing business."
The mere appointing of an agent to act in the state is not enough
to constitute "doing business." A foreign corporation may
bring a possessory action to protect its property rights without
incurring a penalty for not qualifying to do business under the
statute. We have also seen that railroads and barge transpor-
tation companies may send cars over roads within the state or
float barges on the rivers of the state without having to pay
franchise taxes. Beyond this it is hard to predict just how a
court will hold on the facts presented to it.
